Abstract. This paper first shows that when colleges' preferences are substitutable there does not exist any stable matching mechanism that makes truthful revelation of preferences a dominant strategy for every student. The paper introduces student types and captures colleges' preferences for affirmative action via type-specific quotas: A college always prefers a set of students that respects its type-specific quotas to another set that violates them. Then it shows that the student-applying deferred acceptance mechanism makes truthful revelation of preferences a dominant strategy for every student if each college's preferences satisfy responsiveness over acceptable sets of students that respect its type-specific quotas. These results have direct policy implications in several entry-level labor markets (Roth 1991). Furthermore, a fairness notion and the related incentive theory developed here is applied to controlled choice in the context of public school choice by Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (2003) .
Introduction
A college admissions problem is a many-to-one, two-sided matching problem. In several real-life applications of this problem, colleges' preferences over sets of students are determined by gender, racial and ethnic composition. For example, in the British entry-level medical labor market, Edinburgh surgeons may specify that they will employ no more than one female house officer at the same time (Roth 1991) . For some residency programs in the American resident matching market, preferences of hospitals are determined by the composition of professional specialities of students Peranson 1999, Milgrom 2003) .
Similar cases arise in controlled public school choice in the US. Many school districts give parents the opportunity to choose the public school their child attends. However, in some states, choice is limited by court-ordered desegregation guidelines (Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez 2003) . Another example is New York City, where certain city high schools have to admit students across the ability range, with quotas reserved for students with low, middle and high reading scores (Abdulkadirog˘lu, Pathak and Roth 2005) . 1 Giving agents the incentive to reveal their true preferences (dominant strategy incentive compatibility) is not only of theoretical interest, but also of practical concern. These incentives are studied in the literature only when colleges' preferences are represented by a simple ordering of individual students (Dubins and Freedman 1981 and Roth 1982) . However, in each of the examples above, preferences of hospitals/schools cannot be represented by a simple ordering of individual doctors/students. In this paper, we fill this gap by specifying a class of preferences for colleges to capture preferences for gender or racial and ethnic compositions, and studying agents' incentives within this class.
We first show that, when colleges' preferences are substitutable, no stable mechanism is dominant strategy incentive compatible for all students (Theorem 1). This result follows Milgrom (2003) , who shows that, when colleges have substitutable preferences, the student-applying deferred acceptance mechanism (SA-DAA) is not dominant strategy incentive compatible for all students.
Next, we ask: Is there a non-trivial class of preferences that captures affirmative action constraints, and at the same time yields a stable mechanism that is dominant strategy incentive compatible for all students? Our answer is positive. We formalize preferences for affirmative action by introducing typespecific quotas as follows: There exists a finite type space for students, such as fmale, femaleg in case of Edinburgh surgeons. Each student is of exactly one of these types. In addition to its capacity, each college has a type-specific quota. We assume that a college always prefers a set of students that respects its type-specific quotas to another set that violates them. We refer to this assumption as AA (resembling Affirmative Action).
We further impose a restricted responsiveness condition (RR) on colleges' preferences: A college's preferences over sets of students are responsive to its preferences over individual students, restricting the attention only to the sets of students that are acceptable for that college. If a set does not respect a college's type-specific quotas, it is not acceptable for that college. Therefore, RR imposes responsiveness only on those sets that respect a college's typespecific quotas. RR is a generalization of responsiveness when there is more than one type of students. A preference profile that satisfies RR may fail to be responsive (Example 1).
When colleges' preferences satisfy AA and RR, they are substitutable (Lemma 1), so that the set of stable matchings is non-empty (Proposition 1). Moreover, SA-DAA produces a stable matching that every student finds at least as desirable as any other stable matching (Proposition 2).
Our first main result is that, when colleges' preferences satisfy AA and RR, SA-DAA is dominant strategy incentive compatible for all students (Theorem 2). Theorem 2 provides a positive result as opposed to Milgrom's negative result and our even more negative result in Theorem 1. It is also the first to extend dominant strategy incentive compatibility for all students beyond the class of responsive preferences. The positive dominant strategy incentive compatibility result with responsive preferences due to Dubins and Freedman (1981) and Roth (1982) is a corollary of Theorem 2 with a singleton type space.
Our second contribution is a fairness notion for the controlled school choice problem. By embodying AA and RR, our fairness notion provides a novel connection through stability between a controlled school choice problem and an associated college admissions with affirmative action problem in which colleges' preferences satisfy AA and RR. Therefore, it does not only enhance our understanding of the controlled school choice problem, but also yields an important mechanism for real-life applications of the problem.
We introduce our model and give our results in Section 2. We apply our theory to the American resident matching market and controlled public school choice in Section 3. We discuss our class of preferences further in Section 4.
The model and the results

College admissions
A college admissions problem consists of:
[1] A finite set of students S ¼ fs 1 ; . . . ; s n g:
[2] A finite set of colleges C ¼ fc 1 ; . . . ; c m g:
[3] A capacity vector q ¼ ðq c 1 ; . . . ; q c m Þ; where q c is the capacity of college c 2 C.
[4] For every student s 2 S; a strict preference relation P s over C [ fsg: Let P S ¼ ðP s 1 ; . . . ; P s n Þ be the profile of these relations.
[5] For every college c 2 C; a strict preference relation P c over subsets of S:
Let P C ¼ ðP c 1 ; . . . ; P c m Þ be the profile of these relations. (Kelso and Crawford 1982 2 ). Consider the following algorithm, to which we refer as the studentapplying deferred acceptance algorithm (SA-DAA):
Step 1: Each student applies to her most preferred college. Each college rejects all but those in its choice among its applicants.
Step k ! 2: Each student who is rejected at step k À 1 applies to her next most preferred college. Each college considers applicants that it has not rejected. It rejects all but those in its choice among these students.
The algorithm terminates when no student is rejected. Then every student is matchedwiththecollegetowhichsheapplieslastandbywhichsheisnotrejected.
When all the colleges have substitutable preferences, this algorithm produces a stable matching that every student finds at least as desirable as any other stable matching (Theorem 6.8, Roth and Sotomayor 1990, p.176) .
A (direct) mechanism requires agents to reveal their preferences, and selects a matching based on submitted preferences. A mechanism is dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) for an agent if revealing her true preferences is a dominant strategy for that agent in the preference revelation game induced by that mechanism. A stable mechanism is a mechanism that selects a matching that is stable with respect to the submitted preference profile.
It is well known that no stable mechanism is DSIC for every agent (Theorem 3, Roth 1982) . However, there exist restrictions on preferences that are sufficient for the existence of a stable mechanism that is DSIC for every student. To define these restrictions, we introduce additional definitions.
Each P c induces a complete, transitive and strict preference relation for c over singletons of students and [. In particular sP c s 0 [P c P c s 00 reads as follows: College c prefers enrolling s only to enrolling s 0 only; c prefers enrolling s 0 only to leaving positions unfilled; and c prefers leaving positions unfilled to enrolling s 00 only. We refer to this preference relation as c's preferences over individual students.
A college c's preference relation over groups of students is responsive (to its preferences over individual students) if, for any A responsive preference relation is substitutable. Furthermore, when all colleges have responsive preferences, the direct mechanism that is coupled with SA-DAA is DSIC for all students (Theorem 5.16, Roth and Sotomayor 1990) . However, this result does not generalize to substitutable preferences (Milgrom 2003) . We obtain the following even more negative result: Theorem 1. When colleges can have any substitutable preferences, no stable mechanism is DSIC for every student.
Proof: The proof is via a counterexample. Let S ¼ fs 1 ; s 2 ; s 3 g, C ¼ fc 1 ; c 2 g, q c 1 ¼ 2 and q c 2 ¼ 1: Consider the following preference profile P : ; since then m picks the unique stable matching l 00 under P 00 ; i.e. mðP 00 Þ ¼ l 00 ; and
In this case, when the true preference profile is P ; s 2 is better off by misrepresenting her preferences as P 0 s 2 ; since m picks the unique stable matching under P ; i.e. mðP Þ ¼ l; and l 0 2 ðs 2 Þ ¼ c 1 P s 2 s 2 ¼ lðs 2 Þ; a contradiction. So no stable matching mechanism is DSIC for every student. 3 j Note that even if we assume responsive preferences, no stable mechanism is DSIC for every college (Proposition 2, Roth 1985) .
Next, we ask: Is there a non-trivial class of preferences that captures affirmative action constraints, and at the same time yields a stable mechanism that is DSIC for all students? We provide a positive answer to this question in the next section.
College admissions with affirmative action
In addition to the five items in a college admissions problem, a college admissions with affirmative action problem consists of 3 Under P 0 ; students prefer l 0 2 to l 0 1 : Milgrom (2003) uses P and P 0 to show that SA-DAA is not DSIC when colleges can admit any substitutable preferences.
[6] A type space T ¼ fs : If a set does not respect the capacity or affirmative action constraints at c, it is not acceptable for c. Therefore, RR imposes responsiveness only on those sets that respect the capacity and affirmative action constraints. RR reduces to Martı´nez et al. (2000) 's q F -responsiveness when the type space is a singleton. The following example shows that RR does not imply responsiveness.
Example 1. There are two female students ff 1 ; f 2 g and two male students fm 1 ; m 2 g: A college c has two seats, q c ¼ 2; and it prefers to enroll at most one student of each gender, i.e. q f c ¼ 1 and q m c ¼ 1: Otherwise, its preference relation over groups of students is responsive to the following ranking: Roth (1991) obtains a similar result in a many-to-two matching model, where students can be one of two types fmale, femaleg and colleges may specify that they will employ no more than one female student. Then college preferences satisfying this constraint, but otherwise responsive to a simple rank-ordering, are substitutable (Proposition 6, Roth 1991). Lemma 1 generalizes this observation to a many-to-one matching framework when the number of student types may be greater than two. We can deduce the following result: Proposition 1. When colleges' preferences satisfy AA and RR, the set of stable matchings is nonempty.
Substitutability is sufficient for the existence of a stable matching. So Proposition 1 follows directly from Lemma 1. Substitutability is also sufficient for the following result (Theorem 6.8 of Roth and Sotomayor 1990):
Proposition 2. When colleges' preferences satisfy AA and RR, SA-DAA produces a stable matching that every student finds at least as desirable as any other stable matching.
Now we present our first main result:
Theorem 2. When colleges' preferences satisfy AA and RR, SA-DAA is DSIC for every student.
Theorem 2 provides a positive result, which should be compared to Milgrom's negative result and our even stronger result in Theorem 1. It is also the first one to extend DSIC for all students beyond the class of responsive preferences. Furthermore, the DSIC result of Dubins and Freedman (1981) and Roth (1982) is a corollary of our theorem on a singleton type space.
We defer the proof to the appendix. However a short discussion follows here. Dubins and Friedman (1981) and Roth (1982) obtain DSIC for marriage problems (one-to-one matching models). When colleges' preferences are responsive, this result can be easily extended to the college admissions problem as follows: Associate with any college admissions problem a marriage problem in which (i) for every college c; there are q c colleges, c 1 ; :::; c q c ; each with capacity one and the same preferences as c; (ii) the set of students is the same, each student prefers c x toc y if and only if she prefers c toc in the original problem; she prefers c n to c nþ1 ; and c x is acceptable for s if and only if c is acceptable for s in the original problem. Then SA-DAA is DSIC for students in this marriage problem, which is equivalent to the original problem.
In our problem with type-specific quotas, the possibility of P s2T q s c > q c precludes such well-defined constructions of associated marriage problems when there are more than three types. The following example demonstrates this point:
Example 2. Consider a college c with two seats. Suppose that c prefers to enroll at most one student of each of the following types: White, Black, Asian. We can create at most two smaller colleges, c 1 and c 2 , each with capacity one.
Suppose that c 1 is a ''White'' college, i.e. it enrolls white students only; and c 2 is a ''Black'' college. Then Asian students cannot be enrolled in c 1 and c 2 in the associated marriage problem. If c prefers Asian students to other type of students in the original problem, then the matching produced in the associated marriage problem will not be stable in the original problem. Therefore, we have to assign one of c 1 and c 2 to at least two types. The following cases are possible.
Case 1: c 1 is a ''White'' college. Then c 2 must be a ''Black or Asian'' college; it enrolls Black or Asian students. Then, the final allocation will satisfy the type-specific constraints, since no more than one student of each type can be enrolled in these colleges. However, stability is not assured, because c may prefer all Black or Asian students to all White students in the original problem, yet a white student is assigned to c via c 1 in the associated marriage problem.
Case 2: Each of c 1 and c 2 is assigned to at least two types. For example, c 1 is a ''White or Asian'' college, and c 2 is a ''Black or Asian'' college. Then, one type (in this example Asian) will appear in both c 1 and c 2 . Consequently, since more than one Asian student may be matched with c (one with c 1 and one with c 2 ), the match may not respect type-specific quotas.
This simple example can be generalized by extending the type space and/or increasing the capacity and type-specific quotas at c. We provide a direct proof of our DSIC result in the appendix by extending Roth (1982) .
Applications
Entry-level medical labor markets
A doctor in the UK can become eligible for full registration with the General Medical Council only if that doctor completes 12 months in a preregistration position, typically six months in a medical position and six months in a surgical position. In the Edinburgh case, surgeons may specify that they will employ no more than one female house officer in any six month period (Roth 1991 (Roth , 2002 . When every doctor applies for single positions and every hospital's preferences satisfy AA for the type set fmale, femaleg, and are otherwise responsive to a linear ranking of doctors, i.e. satisfy RR, our results apply directly. 4 Roth and Peranson (1999) observe in the American resident matching market 5 that ''the director of a second-year postgraduate residency program arranges with the director of a prerequisite first-year program that his residents will spend their first year in that prerequisite program. However if the second-year program then fails to match as many residents as were anticipated, this leaves vacancies in the first-year program that can be filled by other applicants.'' Our model and results directly apply to this problem: Let p be such a first-year program with total capacity q p : Set the space of student types as T ¼ ffirst-year, second-yearg: Suppose that the second-year program anticipates q 2 q p residents to be matched. Divide p into two smaller programs, p 1 and p 2 with capacities q p 1 ¼ q p À q 2 and q p 2 ¼ q 2 : Set the typespecific capacity constraints at p 
Controlled choice in public schools
Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez (2003) introduce a new class of problems, namely controlled choice problems, in the context of public school choice. A controlled choice problem consists of (1) a finite set of students S ¼ fs 1 ;...; s n g; (2) a finite set of schools C ¼ fc 1 ;...; c m g; (3) school capacities q ¼ ðq c 1 ;...; q c m Þ; (4) for every student s 2 S; a strict preference relation P s over C [ fsg; (5) for every school c 2 C; a strict priority ranking P c of students in S; (6) a type space T ¼ fs 1 ;...; s k g; (7) a type function s : S ! T ; (8) for every school c, a vector of type-specific quotas q Controlled choice attempts to provide choice to students while maintaining racial and ethnic balance at schools. In some states, choice is limited by court-ordered desegregation guidelines, whereas such guidelines are adopted voluntarily in some other schools districts. Controlled choice constraints capture the restrictions imposed by such desegregation guidelines.
A controlled choice problem is essentially a college admissions with affirmative action problem with one distinction: Priorities may not represent school preferences in a controlled choice problem. For example, they may be determined by proximity to a school. One of our main contributions in this paper is a fairness notion that associates a controlled choice problem with a problem of college admissions with affirmative action.
Definition. A matching l is fair in a controlled choice problem if i. the list of students at every school respects capacity and controlled choice constraints under l; and for every s 2 S; lðsÞ is acceptable for s; ii. there do not exist students s; s 0 2 S and a school c 2 C such that cP s lðsÞ and We say that in case (a) s exhibits justified envy at c; and in case (b) s exhibits justified envy for s 0 at c: Fairness or no-envy is a well-studied property in the literature (see for example Tadenuma and Thomson (1991) , also see Young (1995) and Thomson (forthcoming) for an excellent survey). Here, s's envy at c is justified only when either (a) s can be placed at c without violating the capacity and controlled choice constraints at c or (b) s can be placed at c by removing a lower priority student s 0 at c; where the resulting matching does not violate controlled choice constraints at c:
If for some c 2 C; lðcÞ violates c's capacity or controlled choice constraints, then l is not fair. Therefore, (i) embodies the property AA. Also, (ii) is equivalent to saying that for every c 2 C; c's preferences are responsive over sets of students that respect its capacity and controlled choice constraints. In other words, (ii) embodies the property RR. So, we can associate with each controlled choice problem a college admissions with affirmative action problem in which (1) student priorities at schools reflect school preferences over individual students, (2) controlled choice constraints reflect affirmative action constraints, and (3) school preferences satisfy AA and RR. Then the following result follows immediately:
Theorem 3. A matching in a controlled choice problem is fair if and only if it is stable in the associated college admissions with affirmative action problem.
The proof follows from a simple comparison of the definitions of stability and fairness. When colleges' preferences are responsive, Balinski and So¨nmez (1999) observe that fairness in the Turkish college admissions, which is a one-sided matching problem, is equivalent to stability in a corresponding two-sided matching problem. Their result is a corollary to Theorem 3 with singleton type space. Furthermore, Theorem 3 yields the following mechanism for the controlled choice problem: Run SA-DAA in the associated college admissions with affirmative action problem. Our previous results imply the following:
Theorem 4: In the class of controlled choice problems, SA-DAA produces a fair matching that every student finds at least as desirable as any other fair matching. Furthermore, it is DSIC for all students.
Further discussion
We derive our formulation of preferences for affirmative action from certain applications. However, one may imagine more complex environments. For example, in a recent work Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) provide a class of preferences that allow for overlapping affirmative action constraints. In their formulation, a hospital can fill a minority slot or a female slot (but not both) by hiring a female minority doctor.
There are at least two potential improvements for our formalization of preferences, each of which deserves attention and is left for future research.
First, we assume that the type of each student is a one-dimensional variable. However, a college might have preferences for affirmative action along various dimensions. For example, a college might prefer a class that is racially balanced as well as balanced in terms of gender. The following example shows that multi-dimensional type spaces introduce complementarity among students.
Example 3. Let S ¼ fbm; bf ; wm; wf g. A student xy is of race ''x'' and gender ''y''. College c has a capacity of two and prefers to enroll at most one student of each race and at most one student of each gender. Its preferences are given by P c : fbm; wf g fbf ; wmg bm wf bf wm Note that Ch c ðS 0 ¼ fbf ; wm; wf gÞ ¼ fbf ; wmg; whereas bf j 2 Ch c ðS 0 À wmÞ ¼ wf : So, c's preferences are not substitutable. As opposed to Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) , a female minority student here fills both a minority slot and a female slot.
Since we lose substitutability, the existence of a stable matching in the case of a multi-dimensional type space does not follow from previous results. However, substitutability is not a necessary condition. We leave the identification of conditions that guarantee existence with multi-dimensional type spaces for future research.
Second, imposing type-specific quotas alone does not guarantee desegregation unless these quotas are chosen appropriately at each school by the district authority. Consider a school with racial quotas of 75 for majority students, and 55 for minority students. Enrolling 75 majority students and no minority students would not violate the fairness notion above, although the resulting class is fully segregated. We plan to study the consequences of minimum quotas in future as well.
Appendix
A Proof of Theorem 2
We extend the proof of Roth (1982) to our general model. First we introduce more notation. A matching l respects constraints if for every c 2 C; lðcÞ respects constraints at c: For any S 0 & S and s 2 T ; let # s ðS 0 Þ ¼ jfs 2 S 0 : sðsÞ ¼ sgj be the number of type-s students in S 0 : The quota for type s at college c is met under l if # s ðlðcÞÞ ¼ q Under AA and RR, Ch c ðS 0 Þ can be found as follows: Order students in S 0 according to P c : Include one acceptable student in Ch c ðS 0 Þ at a time in this order if the resulting set does not exceed the capacity of c and respects type specific quotas. If the capacity is met at c; no more students are included in Ch c ðS 0 Þ: If the type-specific quota for type s is met at c; no more students of type-s are included in Ch c ðS 0 Þ:
Þ denotes the matching produced by SA-DAA for P : Given P ; let l ¼ DA S ðP Þ and l k ðcÞ be the set of students that are tentatively matched with c at the end of step k of DA S ðP Þ: We say that s is rejected by c in favor of s 0 at step k of DA S ðP Þ if (i) either s 2 l kÀ1 ðcÞ or s applies to c at step k; (ii) s 0 2 l k ðcÞ and s j 2 l k ðcÞ; (iii) ðl k ðcÞ À s 0 Þ [ s respects constraints at c and (iv) sP c [: By the definition of DA S ðP Þ; we have s 0 P c s for any such s 0 : Given P ; define the available set of colleges for s as follows: Aðs; P Þ ¼fc 2 C [ s : 9l;l is stable for P ,lðsÞ ¼ cg: Let cðs; P Þ denote the best alternative in Aðs; P Þ with respect to P s .
Lemma 2. For every s 2 S; DA S ðP Þ matches s with cðs; P Þ:
Proof: Since s is acceptable for herself for every s 2 S, no s 2 S rejects herself in DA S ðP Þ: Suppose that no s 2 S is rejected by any c 2 Aðs; P Þ at steps 1; :::; k À 1 of DA S ðP Þ: Suppose to the contrary that some s 2 S is rejected by some c 2 Aðs; P Þ at step k of DA S ðP Þ: Define S 0 ¼fs 0 2 l k ðcÞ : sðs 0 Þ ¼ sðsÞ g and Proof: By Lemma 4, if a student does not apply to a college c in DA S ðP s ; P Às Þ; she does not apply to c in DA S ðQ s ; P Às Þ either. That is, every c 2 C receives at least as many applications in DA S ðP s ; P Às Þ as it does in DA S ðQ s ; P Às Þ: So, mðcÞ j j lðcÞ j j for every c 2 C: Again, by Lemma 4, the number of unmatched students under m is less than or equal to the number of unmatched students under l: This implies P c2C mðcÞ j j ! P c2C lðcÞ j j. So, for every c 2 C; mðcÞ j j ¼ lðcÞ j j. j Proof of Theorem 2. Given a preference profile P , suppose that s 2 S is not acceptable for c 2 C: Obtain P 0 s from P s by deleting c from P s ; i.e. by making c unacceptable for s: Then DA S ðP s ; P Às Þ ¼ DA S ðP 0 s ; P Às Þ; so that we can assume without loss of generality that a college c is acceptable for a student s only if s is acceptable for c under P : Consequently, a student that is not acceptable for a college c does not apply to c in DA S : We do not need to check unsuccessful misrepresentations. Fix s 2 S: Let Q s be a simple misrepresentation. Suppose that either mðsÞP s lðsÞ or mðsÞ ¼ lðsÞ: We will show that mðsÞP s lðsÞ is not possible.
For any s 0 , we say that s 0 makes a match (with lðs 0 Þ) at step k of DA S ðP s ; P Às Þ if s 0 applies to lðs 0 Þ at step k. Let t be the final step of DA S ðP s ; P Às Þ: Consider a student s 0 who makes a match with c ¼ lðs 0 Þ at step t: We will show that lðs 0 Þ ¼ mðs 0 Þ: First, note the following: (i) No student is rejected by c at step t: Otherwise, the rejected student would be matched after step t; so that t would not be the final step of DA S ðP s ; P Às Þ; a contradiction. (ii) There is always an empty slot at c before step t: Otherwise, in order to match s 0 to c; some other student would be rejected at step t; a contradiction with (i). By (ii) and a similar logic, (iii) the quota limit for typeÀsðs 0 Þ is not met at any step r < t. Then by (ii) and (iii), (iv) no type sðs 0 Þ student is rejected by c in DA S ðP s ; P Às Þ: Therefore, by (ii) and (iv), (v) if a student s 00 is rejected by c at some step in DA S ðP s ; P Às Þ; then sðs 00 Þ 6 ¼ sðs 0 Þ and the quota limit for type sðs 00 Þ is met at c at the time of the rejection of s 00 : Now, suppose to the contrary that c 6 ¼ mðs 0 Þ: By Lemma 4, mðs 0 ÞP s 0 c so that s 0 does not apply to c in DA S ðQ s ; P Às Þ: By Lemma 5, mðcÞ j j ¼ lðcÞ j j: So there exists some s 00 2 S À s 0 such that lðs 00 Þ 6 ¼ c and mðs 00 Þ ¼ c: Then by Lemma 4, cP s 00 lðs 00 Þ: If sðs 00 Þ ¼ sðs 0 Þ; then by (iv), s 00 would apply to and not be rejected by c in DA S ðP s ; P Às Þ; a contradiction. So, sðs 00 Þ 6 ¼ sðs 0 Þ: Also, cP s 00 lðs 00 Þ and lðs 00 Þ 6 ¼ c imply that s 00 is rejected by c at some step r < t of DA S ðP s ; P Às Þ: Then by (v), s 00 is rejected by c in DA S ðP s ; P Às Þ because of the quota limit for type sðs 00 Þ: Therefore, in m ¼ DA S ðQ s ; P Às Þ; s 00 fills in the slot of anotherŝ at c such that sðŝÞ ¼ sðs 00 Þ 6 ¼ sðs 0 Þ; c ¼ lðŝÞ 6 ¼ mðŝÞ: So, the slot that is not filled by s 0 at c under m remains unfilled, which implies mðcÞ j j < lðcÞ j j; a contradiction. So lðs 0 Þ ¼ mðs 0 Þ for every s 0 who makes a match at step t: The rest of the proof is by induction: For r < t; suppose that lðs 0 Þ ¼ mðs 0 Þ for any s 0 who makes her match at step r þ 1 or at a later step of DA S ðP s ; P Às Þ. We have just showed that this is true for r ¼ t À 1: We will show that lðs 0 Þ ¼ mðs 0 Þ for any s 0 who makes her match at step r as well. Now, suppose to the contrary that s 0 makes her match at step r of DA S ðP s ; P Às Þ and c ¼ lðs 0 Þ 6 ¼ mðs 0 Þ. By Lemma 4, mðs 0 ÞP s 0 c; so that s 0 does not apply to c in DA S ðQ s ; P Às Þ: Define S 00 ¼ f s 00 : mðs 00 Þ ¼ c 6 ¼ lðs 00 Þ g: By Lemma 5, mðcÞ j j ¼ lðcÞ j j: So S 00 6 ¼ [: Then by Lemma 4, cP s 00 lðs 00 Þ for every s 00 2 S 00 : So there existsŝ 2 S 00 who is rejected by c in favor of s 0 at step r of DA S ðP s ; P Às Þ. Since s 0 makes her match with c at step r of DA S ðP s ; P Às Þ,ŝ makes her match at a later step r 0 > r of DA S ðP s ; P Às Þ: Then by the induction hypothesis, lðŝÞ ¼ mðŝÞ; a contradiction withŝ 2 S 00 . Therefore, lðs 0 Þ ¼ mðs 0 Þ: Then, the induction on r proves that lðs 0 Þ ¼ mðs 0 Þ for every s 0 2 S, in particular for s: Thus, s cannot successfully manipulate DA S by misrepresenting her preferences. j
